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Abstract 
Simple idealized models seem to provide more understanding than opaque, complex, and 
hyper-realistic models. However, an increasing number of scientists are going in the 
opposite direction by utilizing opaque machine learning models to make predictions and 
draw inferences, suggesting that scientists are opting for models that have less potential for 
understanding. Are scientists trading understanding for some other epistemic or pragmatic 
good when they choose a machine learning model? Or are the assumptions behind why 
minimal models provide understanding misguided? In this paper, using the case of deep 
neural networks, I argue that it is not the complexity or black box nature of a model that 
limits how much understanding the model provides. Instead, it is a lack of scientific and 
empirical evidence supporting the link that connects a model to the target phenomenon that 
primarily prohibits understanding. 
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1 Understanding from Minimal and Complex Models 
A common view in philosophy of science is that simple idealized models provide more 
understanding than complex or hyper-realistic models (Bokulich [2008]; Kuorikoski and 
Ylikoski [2015]; Strevens [2008]). Simpler models are easier to understand. Simpler 
models are more tractable. Simpler models seem to answer more what-if or w-questions, 
and do a better job at highlighting salient difference-makers. Moreover, understanding how 
a model works seems necessary to understand the phenomenon that model seeks to capture. 
However, as philosophers are gaining better insight into minimal models, an 
increasing number of scientists are going in the opposite direction by utilizing deep neural 
net (DNN) machine learning algorithms using large data corpuses to create classifications, 
make predictions, and draw inferences. One example is the deep patient model (Miotto et 
al. [2016]). This model takes as inputs large amounts of patient medical data and gives as 
an output a generalizable patient representation that can be used to predict future medical 
problems. The model provides surprising results. It is able to predict a wide array of 
medical problems, such as schizophrenia, attention-deficit disorder, and severe diabetes, 
with a higher degree of accuracy than competing predictive models. However, with this 
increased accuracy comes increased opacity.  
If we begin from the lessons learned from philosophical work on understanding and 
minimal models, it appears that scientists are curiously opting for models that have less 
potential to increase understanding. DNNs are opaque to modelers, they are increasingly 
complex and have less modeler control, and the amount of w-questions they address are 
seemingly limited. Are scientists trading understanding for some other epistemic or 
pragmatic good when they choose an opaque and complex machine learning model? Or are 
the assumptions behind why minimal models provide understanding misguided? In this 
paper, I argue that model simplicity and transparency are not needed for understanding 
phenomena. It is not simply the complexity or opaqueness of DNN models that limits how 
much understanding they provide. Instead, it is the level of link uncertainty present—that 
is, the extent to which the model fails to be empirically supported and adequately linked to 
the target phenomena—that prohibits understanding. 
To make my argument, I first consider a simple model to illustrate how models can 
explain and provide understanding (§2) before looking to cases of DNN models (§4, §5). I 
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clarify the roles that algorithms play in explaining phenomena and the importance of 
explanatory questions for understanding (§2). I argue that the principle way that algorithms 
are black boxed is by obscuring implementation at various levels (§3). I then argue that it 
is not presence of implementation black boxes that prohibits understanding. Instead, it is 
the level of link uncertainty present that prohibits understanding (§5). In the end, 
understanding phenomena is not directly dependent on model simplicity and transparency. 
It is high levels of link uncertainty that undermines understanding phenomena from opaque 
models.  
 
 
2  Algorithms, Explanatory Questions, and Understanding 
The use of algorithms in scientific inquiry is not new. An algorithm is simply a series of 
steps or set of rules that carries out an action or solves a problem. Any model that utilizes 
a simulation employs an algorithm. Algorithms on their own are not explanations. It is only 
when algorithmic models are used to answer a question about some event or phenomenon 
that they explain. Some examples: How is it possible that the eye evolved in so many 
diverse systems? Why is segregation so prevalent? Or what effect does carbon dioxide have 
on current and future weather patterns? Other distinguishing features of explanation 
(causal, counter-factual, law-covering, et cetera.) are still widely discussed. As a starting 
point, I will adopt the increasingly common view that explanation aims at understanding 
(De Regt [2017]; Grimm [2010]; Khalifa [2017]; Potochnik [2011], [2015]; Strevens 
[2008]). In a slogan: explaining why helps us to understand why.  
The exact relationship between understanding and explanation is still the subject of 
widespread disagreement. Some question whether explanation is necessary or sufficient 
for understanding. It may be that one can gain understanding without explanation (Lipton 
[2009]), or it may be that in addition to explanation, agents need to meet other epistemic 
conditions to understand (Grimm [2014]; Hills [2016]; Lawler [2018]; Sullivan [2018]). I 
set these issues aside. The central issue in this paper is whether explanations that utilize 
complex and opaque models are unable to provide understanding of phenomena in virtue 
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of the fact that the model itself is not well understood or black boxed.1 My arguments do 
not so much trade on any positive notion of what understanding or explanation is, but on 
whether, given a lack of information, it is still possible to gain insight about a phenomenon. 
I am concerned with what Humphreys ([2004], [2009]) calls epistemic opacity: the extent 
to which the process of the model and its derived output are inaccessible to scientists and 
modelers.2  
Before considering the complex case of DNNs, it is worthwhile to first consider a 
simple case to illustrate the way that models explain and provide understanding of 
phenomenon.  
Thomas Schelling was interested in understanding why so many human populations 
are segregated. He created a model that aims to simulate a neighbourhood where 
individuals act on simple preferences in order to see the conditions under which segregation 
occurs. Schelling’s checkerboard model has been discussed extensively in philosophy 
(Rohwer and Rice [2013]; Mäki [2009]; Grüne-Yanoff [2009]) and in the social sciences 
(Clark [1991], [1992]; Bobo & Zubrinsky [1996]). The model is simple. It is a simulation 
that consists of a grid with two types of actors, A and B, where both types act on one simple 
preference—that at least 30% of their neighbours are the same type. The simulation follows 
a simple algorithm: if more than 70% of the actors adjacent to a particular actor are of a 
different kind, move that actor to the closest unoccupied space. Repeat until no actors move. 
The equilibrium result, after several iterations, is a segregated board.  
There are several possible explanatory questions that one could ask of this model, 
and depending on the question, a different explanation is called for. First, one could ask: 
how does the simulation work? To answer this question, one needs to know the details of 
the algorithm including expected input and output. The basic algorithm is so simple that 
Schelling originally designed this simulation not using a computer, but with two different 
types of coins on a checkerboard. Since then, the model has been implemented on 
computational systems in many different ways and at varying levels of complexity 
                                               
1 The use of explanation in machine learning often corresponds to justification, such as explaining how a 
model operates in order to justify a decision. In this paper, I am using explanation in a broader sense, in terms 
of explaining a target phenomenon. Models are part of explanations that are answers to questions that enable 
understanding of the target phenomenon. 
2 The type of opacity I am concerned with is close to Burrell’s ([2016]) use of opacity in regards to the way 
algorithms “operate at the scale of application”.  
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(Muldoon et al. [2012]). Questions about how the model or algorithm itself works takes 
our focus away from the phenomenon it bears on. There is a distinction between 
understanding and explaining how the model works and using that model to understand a 
phenomenon of interest. If one is chiefly concerned about explaining or understanding how 
a given model is implemented, it is not necessary to know how the model maps on to some 
real-world phenomenon. The question of this paper, on the other hand, is to what extent 
understanding the model is necessary for gaining understanding of the phenomenon that 
the model explains.  
Schelling himself was interested in explaining phenomena with his model. He 
asked whether it is possible that segregation could occur based on individual preferences 
alone without institutional racism, thus going beyond the algorithm and toward 
understanding possibilities surrounding a real-world phenomenon. In order to explain how 
it is possible segregation could occur, the explanation must include how the algorithmic 
model simulates a possible population that could be affected by segregation by identifying 
the key mechanism behind the algorithm and how it maps onto a possible population. In 
this case, the coins represent people of different races. The empty spaces represent move-
in ready houses. The catalyst for moving is a preference of nearest-neighbours being the 
same race. This mapping allows us to interpret the results of the simulation as identifying 
a possible causal mechanism of segregation. Explaining segregation in this fashion is an 
example of what philosophers of science have recently called a how-possibly explanation 
(Rohwer and Rice [2013]; Reutlinger et al. [2017]). The model is used to explain how it is 
possible that a neighbourhood could become segregated through a possible causal 
mechanism. From this explanation, we are able to gain understanding of the possible 
mechanisms that could operate in real-world populations because it isolates key possible 
causal mechanisms.  
However, how-possibly explanations stop short of answering how-actually 
questions or why-questions about actual real-world populations (Sullivan and Khalifa 
[2019]; van Riel [2015]). If we want to explain and understand why so many real-world 
populations are segregated, or why a particular population is segregated, we need to go 
beyond mere possibilities. The explanation employing Schelling’s model must include 
details about how the algorithm simulates a real population, that is, how the key features 
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of the algorithm map on to real-world populations. Furthermore, the explanation needs to 
include empirical justification of the claim that individual racial preferences is a salient 
mechanism that drives real world population moving patterns (Mäki [2009]; Sullivan and 
Khalifa [2019]).  
Without empirical evidence validating that the possible causes identified by 
Shelling’s model are actual causes, there is no link connecting the model to the 
phenomenon. There is a high level of link uncertainty, that is, a lack of scientific and 
empirical evidence supporting the link that connects the model to the target phenomenon. 
At the time Schelling’s model was introduced, it failed to explain or enable understanding 
due to the fact that there was no empirical evidence connecting personal preferences to the 
causes of actual segregation in real-world populations. It wasn’t until many years after 
Schelling’s model was introduced that it was tested empirically, providing some limited 
evidence that individual preferences are an actual cause of segregation, not merely a 
possible cause (Clark [1991], [1992]). Indeed, if we suppose instead that the empirical 
evidence suggested that all segregation is the result of institutional racism or individual 
racial prejudice, so that Schelling’s mechanisms for segregation were never realized in any 
real-world system, then we would have no reason to think that Schelling’s model uncovers 
any actual causes of segregation, and thus would not be able to explain segregation or 
enable any real understanding. Thus, Schelling’s model only provides understanding in so 
far as there is there is a link connecting the model to the phenomenon.  
The way of establishing the necessary link is with additional scientific evidence 
that supports the connection between the causes or dependencies that the model uncovers 
to those causes or dependencies operating in the target phenomenon. What constitutes the 
amount and kind of scientific evidence needed to reduce link uncertainty will differ 
depending on the phenomenon and the model. In the case of Schelling’s model, link 
uncertainty is inversely related to the amount and quality of empirical evidence connecting 
individual preferences to causes of segregation and a lack of evidence that suggests a 
different overriding causal factor. Importantly, establishing the necessary link connecting 
the phenomenon to the model does not thereby replace the need for or the epistemic value 
of the model. The model still explains even once the link between the model and the 
phenomenon is no longer uncertain. Schelling’s model could still provide insight into why 
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a population that has the preferences required for the affect to take place is likely to become 
segregated. In fact, it is precisely when the link uncertainty is removed that the model is 
able to explain and provide understanding. 
I’ll return to the notion of link uncertainty later. For now, the important takeaway 
is that when we consider DNN models and how their opacity may prevent understanding 
of phenomena, we cannot consider the model in isolation. The focus should not be unduly 
placed on how the model works, but instead consider the explanatory question we ask of 
the model, the role that the algorithm or model plays in the explanation, and the amount, 
quality, and kind of scientific evidence needed in order to connect the model to the target 
phenomenon. We now turn to considering model opacity and the impact black boxes have 
on understanding. 
 
 
3 Black Boxes 
Black box explanations are also commonplace in scientific inquiry. Many explanations in 
various domains obscure low level details to explain higher level causal mechanisms or 
non-causal dependencies. Examples include explanations of universality in physics and 
explanations of convergent evolution, among others (Batterman and Rice [2014]). One can 
gain understanding of these phenomena without knowing all the details. A special problem 
seems to emerge with DNN models because the opacity goes beyond simply black boxing 
low level or irrelevant details. Engineers or modelers that design DNN models themselves 
do not fully know how the model determines the output. If the modeler cannot explain how 
the DNN algorithm works, then how can it be used to explain or understand some 
phenomenon? In this section, I clarify that the black box at issue here is one of 
implementation. I discuss varying levels of implementation black boxes and the potential 
impact they have on explaining and understanding phenomena.  
 
 
3.1 Implementation black boxes 
One way algorithmic models can be black boxed is that some level of detail regarding how 
the model is implemented is obscured. A modeler may know the broad outline of the 
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algorithm’s structure without knowing how each step is exactly implemented. In such a 
case, there is a black box around implementation; the implementation is either unknown or 
illegible to the modeler, the explainer, or the understander. 
Consider a simple example of computing factorials. There are different ways one 
could implement factorials in a computer system. Two basic methods are an iterative 
process and a recursive process. Using the language Scheme, each process can be expressed 
as shown in figure 1 (Abelson et al. 1996, 32-34). 
 
Figure 1 
Code examples of a recursive and iterative process for computing factorials 
 
Not only is each method syntactically different, but semantically and operationally 
different under the hood as well (see figure 2, and Abelson et al. [1996], pp. 32-4). Thus, 
the exact implementation makes a difference to how the simulation and the computer 
system operate. However, in many cases it is not important to know exactly how a 
simulation or computer system is implemented, as long as the inputs and outputs remain 
the same. If a climate model involves computing factorials, it is unnecessary for the 
modeler to know, or make explicit in explaining climate patterns, how exactly the factorials 
were implemented. Details regarding the implementation are unnecessary for explaining 
and understanding why a particular climate pattern emerged.  
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Figure 2a:                                                                            Figure 2b: 
Recursive process for computing 7!                                Iterative process for computer 7! 
 
The irrelevance of implementation goes beyond simple computations. 
Implementation black boxes are present and similarly irrelevant to understanding the 
causes of segregation using Schelling’s checkerboard model. There are countless 
implementations of Schelling’s model that follow the same basic higher-level algorithm 
regarding satisfying neighbourhood preferences. In order to gain understanding of possible 
mechanisms of segregation, or actual mechanisms of segregation, one does not need to 
know whether Schelling’s model was implemented using a functional, object-oriented, or 
actor-based language, even though these implementation differences make a difference to 
how the computer system operates and executes the algorithm. More drastically, in 
Schelling’s case one does not even need to know whether the model was implemented on 
a computer system at all or whether it was implemented on a checkerboard, chessboard or 
a Go board in order to explain or understand segregation using the model. Thus, 
implementation black boxing in itself does not undermine our ability to explain or 
understand phenomena.  
Of course, there are cases where the implementation matters. As argued above, the 
question and phenomenon of interest determine the scope of the explanation and level of 
detail necessary for success. If the low-level implementation details made a difference to 
the high level results of Schelling’s model, then the implementation would matter for 
explaining and understanding segregation. However, as it so happens, these details do not 
make a difference. On the other hand, if the explanatory question concerns implementation 
or why building a model in a particular way is preferable, then knowledge of the 
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implementation is needed. In the factorial case, one may choose the iterative process if it 
is necessary to be able to track the state of the system at any point in the process, something 
that is not possible with a recursive implementation. So while it is possible for 
implementation black boxes to impede understanding, they are not in principle problematic 
for explaining or understanding phenomena.  
 
 
3.2 Levels of implementation black boxes 
Implementation black boxes can occur at varying levels, especially in an algorithmic 
model. Each step in an algorithm can often be broken down into further sub-steps. We can 
talk about the algorithm for the whole task, say the algorithm for computing factorials, or 
the algorithm for its each of its sub-steps, the sub-steps of its sub-steps, and so on. In the 
iterative process for computer factorials (figure 1), the first sub-step is fact-iter. Fact-
iter has further sub-steps, such as computing multiplication and addition. In the iterative 
code example in figure 1, the fact-iter algorithm is not black boxed, but the 
multiplication and addition algorithms are. One of the goals in designing computer systems 
is to build modular systems. That way, a division of labour among engineers working on 
varying levels of the system can take place without each person needing to know how each 
of the sub-steps (lower level algorithms) are implemented.  
 While some levels of implementation black boxes do not get in the way of 
understanding, there do seem to be other instances of implementation black boxes that 
might pose a problem. For some algorithms, not all sub-steps are fixed or comprehensible 
to the modeler. It can be that in the course of running the simulation, some aspect of the 
algorithm itself changes or updates. In this case, there is less modeler control since the 
system is in an evolving state. Being in the dark about how the algorithm changes or is 
impacted through the execution of the simulation is just another instance of an 
implementation black box: there is something about the implementation of a higher level 
algorithm that is obscured.  
Applying this to Schelling’s model, we see that it utilizes these more mid-level 
implementation black boxes. The coins occupying the squares are moving around the board 
and continuously fed back into the program to determine which coin will move next. There 
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is an updating algorithm that is black boxed. Each time the simulation runs with different 
initial conditions, the ordering of movements, and which coins move, differs. The resulting 
segregated pattern is not known to the modeler beforehand because of the underlying 
complexity of the model. Despite this, the high-level algorithm stays intact: an iteration of 
coin movements until at least 30% of neighbours are of the same type. The result of the 
algorithm—a segregated board—also stays the same. In order to gain understanding of 
segregation using Schelling’s model, you do not need to peer inside and see the 
implementation here. We have the same level of understanding of the mechanisms of 
segregation whether or not the implementation black box is removed. The explanation does 
not rely on the specific movements of, say, coin-267, but on the macrolevel emergence of 
a segregated pattern. This is true even if the algorithm is indeterminate, such that it is not 
even possible in theory to predict the resulting segregated pattern because the algorithm 
involves random choice of which actors to move next. Instead, as argued above, it is the 
link connecting Schelling’s model to the phenomenon of segregation that would provide 
understanding. It is not implementation black boxing that gets in the way of understanding, 
it is link uncertainty. 
That said, what if there is nothing about the algorithm that is known? What if we 
have the highest-level of implementation black boxing? This occurs when all the details of 
the algorithm are obscured—only the inputs and outputs are known. In cases where there 
is only a mapping of inputs to outputs, there is a strong intuition that the possibility for 
explanation and understanding is quite limited. Consider hypothetically that if all we knew 
of Schelling’s model is that it takes in a board with two different coloured dots dispersed 
randomly as an input and gives back dots clustered into segregated patterns as output; it is 
hard to see how this can be used to explain segregation based on individual preferences, or 
anything for that matter. Similarly, if a black box computes factorials and we know nothing 
about what factorials are, then our understanding is quite limited. However, if we already 
know what factorials are, then this highest-level black box, for factorials, turns into a 
simple implementation black box that is compatible with understanding. This suggests that 
the level of the black box, which is coupled with our background knowledge of the model 
and the phenomenon the model bears on, matters for understanding, in addition to the type 
of explanatory question asked and the amount of link uncertainty present. Thus, when we 
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look to cases of DNN models, we need to ask whether we have the highest level of 
implementation black boxing, which is the question we turn to next. 
 
 
4 The Black Boxes of Deep Neural Networks 
Consider the deep patient DNN model designed by researchers at Mount Sinai (Miotto et 
al. [2016]). The model builds a generalizable abstract patient representation that can inform 
clinical decision making. The model takes as input electronic medical records represented 
numerically and gives as output the deep patient representation. In theory, the model can 
be part of a process used for several different tasks including identifying patients for 
clinical trials, detecting similarity between patients, and predicting disease. The 
researchers’ first focus has been on disease prediction, aiming to show that DNN models 
can be applicable to a wide range of disease detection problems instead of being optimized 
for one specific disease, such as melanoma (discussed below). Down the line, researchers 
hope to build on this model to aid doctors in devising treatment recommendations. The 
model was trained on over 700,000 patients, with a subset of 76,214 patients analysed for 
disease prediction. Each of the patients in the subset had at least ten records between 1980-
2013 and at least one new medical diagnosis in 2014. The model tested each patient against 
seventy-eight different medical problems ranging from severe diabetes and particular 
cancers to schizophrenia. Interestingly, the model was able to increase predictive accuracy 
(the proportion of true results, both true positives and true negatives, among the total 
number of examined cases) by 15%. 
 The deep patient model is quite impressive, especially given its high accuracy for 
predicting medical problems like schizophrenia, which can be difficult for physicians to 
predict. However, the model is largely opaque. One of the modelers of deep patient, Joel 
Dudley, expressed the point as follows: “we can build these models, but we don’t know 
how they work” (Knight [2017]). Is it possible to gain understanding from the model 
despite its opacity? As I have been arguing, in order to consider how opacity limits 
understanding, we need to isolate the explanatory question of interest, the level of link 
uncertainty present, and determine the depth of the black boxes in the deep patient model, 
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and in DNN models more generally. In what follows, I first consider the latter and then 
return to explanatory questions and link uncertainty in section 5. 
 
 
4.1 DNN structure 
LeCun et al. ([2015], pp. 438) define deep-learning architectures broadly as “a multilayer 
stack of simple modules, all (or most) of which are subject to learning, and many of which 
compute non-linear input–output mappings”. The basic multilayer structure of deep neural 
networks, including the deep patient model, is shown in figure 3. There are many different 
types of DNN models, such as convolutional neural networks (CNN), recurrent neural 
networks (RNN), and multilayer perceptrons (MLP). The exact structure and 
implementation of each type of DNN varies.3 However, the nuances of these different 
techniques do not impact the larger argument concerning opacity and understanding; thus, 
the following discussion is a simplified overview of DNNs, which, in particular, highlights 
fully-connected layers.4 DNN models are inspired by their namesake of neural networks in 
the brain; however, machine learning researchers are not aiming to model or simulate how 
a human brain works when building the types of models discussed in this paper.5  
                                               
3 For an accessible overview of different DNN techniques and methods see Guo et al. ([2016]) and LeCun et 
al. ([2015]). Generally speaking, recurrent neural networks (RNN) are ideal when data is sequentially 
ordered, as is the case with natural language or in time series. Convolutional neural networks (CNN), on the 
other hand, are often used when data has a clear spatial structure, as is the case with image classifiers (Shickel 
et al. [2018]). 
4 Different DNN architectures can include different types of layers that play different roles. For example, 
CNNs consists of the type of fully-connected layers described in the main text, while also first made up of 
convolution layers that create feature maps using local connectivity followed by pooling layers that reduce 
the dimensions of the feature maps (Guo et al. [2016], Shickel et al. [2018]). 
5 See Goodfellow et al. ([2016], Chapter 1) for a discussion on how DNNs used in computer science are 
inspired by the brain and the limits of this analogy. For a philosophical treatment of these limits, see Bailer-
Jones and Bailer-Jones ([2002]). Alternatively, the field of computational neuroscience does seek to model 
the brain and draw inferences using DNNs (Glorot et al. [2011]). See Buckner ([2018]) for a philosophical 
argument that DNNs (CNNs in particular) capture processes of the brain. Since this paper is not about brain 
processing explanations in computational neuroscience, I leave these latter considerations aside.  
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Figure 3: 
Standard Deep Neural Network Structure 
 
DNN models consist of an input layer, one or even hundreds of hidden layers 
(making the neural net deep), and an output layer. The edges that point from the nodes of 
the input layer to the nodes in the first hidden layer represent weights assigned to each 
piece of input data. The nodes of the hidden layer represent an activation function that is a 
non-linear function that takes as input the value of each of the previous nodes with its 
associated edge weight (and sometimes a bias value). The activation function that is often 
used is sigmoid, but modelers may choose other non-linear functions such as the hyperbolic 
tangent function or rectified linear units. The output of the activation function then serves 
as the new node input value for the next hidden layer (figure 4). The process repeats for 
each node in each layer, and for each edge connecting each node in each layer, until it 
reaches the output layer and delivers the final output. A DNN with hundreds of hidden 
layers could have hundreds of millions of connections and adjustable weights. The 
activation functions, the number of layers, the input data (and how it is represented), and 
the number of nodes in each layer are all determined by the modeler.  
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Figure 4: 
Computing the value of a single node in the subsequent layer 
 
DNNs are designed to learn which weights should be assigned to each feature in 
order to maximize predictive power and identify patterns in data that are not easily 
detectible by humans. While this is quite abstract, it has an intuitive basis. When a 
physician diagnoses someone with a particular disease, there are several data points that 
the physician considers and weighs differently. For example, the age of the patient is no 
doubt relevant, but presumably less relevant than a known blood marker for the disease. 
So, just as the physician weighs these pieces of information differently when making a 
determination, DNNs tease out the relevant features from the irrelevant for the task at hand. 
The exact representational relationship between the layers, and the exact functioning of the 
DNN, will differ depending on the phenomena modelled, type of DNN, and the choice of 
activation and learning functions. For example, in a standard image classifier, the first layer 
analyses the picture in the form of individual pixels, with numerical values representing 
the hue, saturation, and more. The next layer isolates a collection of pixels that start to pick 
out higher level arrangements, such as lines or edges. Each resulting layer gradually picks 
out higher and higher level abstractions until it reaches a classification of the image. In the 
deep patient model, the input data consists of electronic medical records of patients, each 
of which was pre-processed to identify clinically relevant phenotypes, and normalized to 
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lie between zero and one. The output of the model provides a more abstract patient 
representation where only the most important derived dimensions remain.6  
 
 
4.2 DNN modelling process 
The process of creating a DNN model starts with a training and learning phase, followed 
by validation and testing. Training, testing and validation are part of the modelling process 
that results in a model that can be applied to novel cases with success. A fundamental 
statistical assumption behind this procedure is the inductive learning hypothesis: that if a 
model7 fits well over a sufficiently large set of training examples, it will also fit well over 
other unobserved or new examples. It is in the training phase that the machine learns and 
makes adjustments to the weights of each connection throughout the network.8 The way in 
which the model “learns” which weights are optimal and corrects for error is through the 
backpropagation process, also determined by the modeler. This involves correcting for 
errors, often using stochastic gradient descent, to get the desired results. For example, in 
the case of a supervised learning image classifier, training data is labelled with the correct 
value, and the machine works through the backpropagation process to reduce error and 
settle on a set of weights that best captures the phenomenon.  
After the model is trained, validation and testing are required to ensure the model 
is generalizable. The modeler determines what regularization methods to employ in order 
to avoid overfitting the data. For example, one regularization technique called dropout 
randomly omits a certain number of weights or activations (edges or nodes). The thought 
is that such a method can control against the model learning any odd particularities of the 
                                               
6 Some have compared DNN procedures to other coarse-graining abstraction procedures in physics, such as 
renormalization group methods (Mehta and Schwab [unpublished]). See also the information bottleneck 
method and its application to DNNs (Tishby et al. [1999]; Tishby and Zaslavsky [2015]). Despite the 
differences in the way that neural nets analyze data, they all seek to tease out what is relevant from the 
irrelevant for the task at hand.    
7 In machine learning, the word “hypothesis” is often used interchangeably with “model”. A hypothesis is a 
function described by the set of weights that is presumed to capture the phenomenon. The target function is 
the function that will truly capture the phenomenon. Often the target function is an ideal that is not reachable; 
the goal is to settle on a hypothesis that is as close to the ideal target function as possible (see Mitchell 
[1997]). 
8 In more complex DNN models a bias parameter is also included in the weighted sum and can be modified 
through the learning process. 
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training data that would prevent generalizability (Baldi et al. [2013]; Wan et al. [2013]). 
The modeler then tests the accuracy of the model with data different from the training 
phase. If all goes well, then the modeler has a model that is able to generalize over the 
intended use cases. Importantly, modelers are not working completely in the dark. They 
rely on fundamental statistical assumptions and theories to ensure that the resulting model 
is generalizable.9 Depending on the size and type of dataset, different statistical guidelines 
are utilized. For example, testing and training data should have a similar distribution to 
ensure statistical validity.10  
The result of the modelling process produces a DNN model that follows its own 
algorithm that it learned through the modelling process. The modelling process is what 
determines the set of steps or rules that the resulting model will follow with any new input 
data it receives. 
 
 
4.3 Levels of DNN black boxes 
As argued in section 3, the level of the black box plays a central role in determining how 
much understanding is possible. Is the level of black boxing of DNNs problematic for 
understanding? It should be clear from the above discussion that DNNs are not black boxed 
at the highest level either during the modelling process, or in the resulting model.  
First, the modelling process of DNNs involve basic implementation black boxing. 
The modeler is often working with higher level function calls where the exact 
implementation is unknown. For example, the modeler does not know how the sigmoid or 
gradient descent function is implemented, and would simply make a function call, like 
“sig(…)” when using the functionality to implement the activation functions for the nodes 
in each hidden layer. As argued above, this type of implementation black boxing does not 
hinder understanding phenomena. However, the implementation black boxes are deeper 
still. As the computer learns different weights for each data point, the output from each 
layer changes and serves as a new input for the next layer throughout the execution of the 
program. The modeler cannot predict which data points will be most salient, nor can the 
                                               
9 See Cristianini ([2010]) for a discussion on the history and use of statistical methods and machine learning. 
10 For a discussion of statistical guidelines, see Mitchell ([1997]) especially chapter 5.  
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modeler interpret the ways in which the machine settled on certain weights for certain 
pieces of data given the complexity and high number of data points. The implementation 
black boxing is increased when regularization methods like dropout are applied. The 
modeler does not even know which weights or activations will be deployed in a given 
iteration. Thus, the modeler does not have direct control over assigning weights to specific 
data points. In fact, usually the process starts with randomly assigned weights, with the 
system making changes through various iterations. However, the modeler relies on a wealth 
of knowledge and research about what methods to follow to build a generalizable model 
for the task at hand. So, while the modeler does not have direct control over the modelling 
process, a contrast case with Schelling’s model, still the process is not black boxed at the 
highest level, such that it would prevent understanding of the phenomenon the resulting 
model aims to capture. 
Once the model is trained, the modeler still has a general idea of how the finalized 
model works in virtue of having knowledge about how the model was trained and validated. 
However, it is only through indirect means that the modeler can investigate whether the 
model is picking up on what seems to be the most relevant features for the task at hand. 
For example, in an image classifier the modeler can deploy saliency maps where the model 
highlights certain areas of the image that was found to be the most relevant for its 
calculation. This goes a long way in determining the suitability of the model. Consider that 
there can be cases where the model focuses on aspects of the image that are clear proxies 
and not real difference makers, such as the time of day for a tank classifier, or the snowy 
background for a dog versus wolf classifier (Ribeiro et al. [2016]). Saliency maps can help 
us identify cases like this and rule the model unsuitable. Indirect methods like saliency 
maps still consist only of general approximations, not detailed assessments, with several 
low-level and mid-level dependencies remaining obscured. However, different types of 
saliency testing are enough to satisfy our need to know the high level details of how the 
model works to open the door to understanding the phenomenon the model bears on. 
 Putting all this together, when Dudley says “we can build these models, but we 
don’t know how they work”, he is saying that, on the one hand, we know enough about the 
modelling process (the higher level algorithms that train and create the deep patient model) 
such that one can build a model—and make intelligent changes to improve output and 
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prediction. On the other hand, the fact that there still remains low-level ‘reasoning’ and 
implementation black boxes in the resulting deep patient model—even after indirect 
saliency testing—undermines understanding. Thus, there is a lingering concern that even 
though black boxes of DNN models are not at the highest level, still the understanding we 
gain from these models is limited because of the lower level opacity in the DNN model 
itself. In the next section, I argue that when we focus on the types of explanatory questions 
we can ask of the models, the lingering problems for understanding that remain are not 
foremost due to the implementation black boxes, but because there is a certain level of link 
uncertainty. 
 
 
5 Understanding, Explanation, and Link Uncertainty 
Recall that the way that models explain depends in part on the explanatory question asked. 
In section 2, three different types of questions were introduced: questions directed at how 
the model works, how-possibly questions about a target phenomenon, and why or how-
actually questions concerning a real-world phenomenon or target system. We saw with 
Schelling’s model that implementation black boxes are compatible with understanding 
possibilities surrounding target systems and compatible with how-actually and why 
questions surrounding target systems. On the other hand, not surprisingly, implementation 
black boxes can inhibit understanding of how the model works.  
Similarly, there are several questions that we could ask of DNN models, each with 
varying degrees of answerability. For example, in the deep patient case, we could ask 
questions about the structure of the model and how it works. We could ask simple 
classificatory questions, such as: Which disease is patient x likely to develop? We could 
also ask explanatory questions of the model, like the one the researchers were after: how 
is it possible to use a single model to predict a variety of diseases instead of relying on 
several models each designed for one disease? We could also ask more pointed questions: 
why is patient x predicted to develop disease y? Why are certain medical indicators 
associated with high risk for developing disease y? 
The main challenge is whether the various implementation black boxes that prevent 
us from explaining and understanding certain aspects about how the model works also 
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prohibit explaining and understanding the phenomenon the model bears on. As we saw 
with Schelling’s model, explanation and understanding of real-world segregation was only 
possible when the link connecting the model to the phenomenon was established, in other 
words by eliminating link uncertainty. On the contrary, knowing more about the model 
implementation did not increase understanding. It is my contention that the same is true 
with DNNs.  
 
 
5.1 DNNs and how-possibility explanations 
The deep patient model provides us with how-possibly explanations. Recall that a how-
possibly explanation simply highlights a possibility concerning the causes or dependencies 
of some phenomenon; it falls short of explaining how the target phenomena actually is 
caused or the actual dependences concerning the phenomenon. The deep patient model can 
explain the researchers’ main motivation—answering how it is possible to predict disease 
development for a range of diseases—simply by appealing to the input data and the higher 
level workings of the model discussed in the previous section. The model can also be used 
to explain how it is possible to predict schizophrenia (or any of the other seventy-seventy 
medical problems) through past medical records alone. Simply having a highly predictive 
model, and knowing the high-level emerging properties of the model, uncovers that it is 
possible to use a machine learning representation for disease prediction. Importantly, it is 
not necessary to look inside the implementation black box to answer these types of how-
possibly questions. All that is needed is the higher-level understanding of how the system 
is able to identify high-level patterns within data.  
With Schelling’s model, peering inside the black box and examining how each coin 
moves around the board does not improve our understanding of how it is possible 
segregation can occur based on individual preferences alone. Similarly, with the deep 
patient model, learning more about the exact fine-grained weights of different data points, 
and the exact way the machine learning algorithm settles on and applies certain weights, 
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does not improve our understanding of how it is possible schizophrenia can be predicted 
and correlated with features found in medical records.11  
However, things do seem to change when we move from a how-possibly 
explanation to a how-actually explanation or a more pointed why question. It does seem as 
though we cannot give a satisfying explanation for why a particular patient developed a 
particular medical problem using the deep patient model. After all, the model does not 
speak to why a certain marker is linked to a disease. Moreover, it also seems that we are 
unable to get a satisfying explanation for why it is actually the case that certain indicators 
reliably go hand in hand with a given disease using the deep patient model. Pointing to the 
gradient descent algorithm does not give us the right sort of insight here. We want some 
indication that the model is picking out the real difference makers for identifying a given 
disease and not proxies, general rules of thumb, or artefacts within a particular dataset. 
While it is tempting to attribute this gap in understanding to the implementation black box 
of the deep patient model, we should not take the bait.  
 
 
5.2 DNNs and link uncertainty 
Recall that link uncertainty constitutes a lack of scientific and empirical evidence 
supporting the link connecting the model to the target phenomenon. In the case of 
Schelling’s model, link uncertainty was reduced after empirical evidence suggested that in 
real world populations individual preferences were a considerable causal factor that 
governed moving choices in segregated cities.  
In the deep patient case, the model is greatly informed by existing empirical 
evidence concerning diseases. The modelers made particular determinations of which 
medical problems to include in their predictions and which ones to exclude. For example, 
they did not seek predictions of HIV because of the large behavioural aspect to the disease 
                                               
11 A worry that someone might have here is that since the knowledge of how a given DNN is trained is 
generally applicable to all (or most) DNN models, that this knowledge is epistemically independent from 
understanding a target phenomenon. However, generality qua generality does not make something 
epistemically independent. In this case, it seems that it is precisely because of the generality of the knowledge 
that it can help to uncover how-possibly explanations. The core of how Schelling’s model works is also 
generally applicable to any type clustering behaviour. It is because of this general applicability that it serves 
as a possible explanation for segregation.  
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(Miotto et al. [2016], pp. 5). Having prior knowledge about which records are salient for 
medical diagnosis helped lead to the success of the model. However, gaps in medical 
knowledge still exist. Part of the reason for building the deep patient model is because the 
level of uncertainty about why certain patients develop certain medical problems remains 
high. Link uncertainty is prevalent. This is highlighted by the ways the model did not meet 
expectations. For example, the modelers found that the model had trouble predicting 
certain diseases that otherwise should have been predicted with ease, such as diabetes 
mellitus without complications. Their hypothesis was that since the screening process of 
diabetes often occurs during routine check-ups, the frequency of those tests was not a valid 
discriminating factor. This suggests that the model in part tracks proxies of disease 
development, such as previous physicians’ decisions to carry out a diagnostic test. Given 
this, there is still link uncertainty that prevents understanding of real-world instances of 
disease development. 
The deep patient model is still able to provide how-possibly explanations and 
understanding of possibilities. More than this it points to possible correlations that are 
worthy of future scientific and empirical research. It is the patterns that the deep patient 
model indicates that gives researches hypotheses to test and gain additional evidence for 
the strength of these patterns in real-world cases. Exploring these hypotheses further would 
reduce the link uncertainty and increase the level of understanding the deep patient model 
could provide on disease development. The type of scientific evidence needed to reduce 
the link uncertainty, in this case, could consist of building additional statistical models that 
makes the deep patient results more robust, conducting clinical trials, or conducting various 
longitudinal studies. The scientific standards of evidence for the domain in question 
determines how to establish an acceptable link connecting the model to the phenomenon. 
The stronger the link, the greater possible understanding the model can provide. 
As we saw with Schelling’s model, once the link uncertainty is resolved, the 
additional empirical evidence does not replace the usefulness of the model to explain and 
enable understanding. So too in the deep patient case, once the link uncertainty is resolved, 
the deep patient model is able to explain and enable understanding of disease development. 
Indeed, it is precisely because of reducing link uncertainty that this understanding is 
possible. For example, physicians can use the model, along with the link connecting the 
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model to the phenomenon, to explain and enable understanding for patients about their risk 
factors.  
 
 
5.3 Differences in understanding; differences in link uncertainty 
In order to strengthen the case that it is the level of link uncertainty present that prohibits 
explanation and understanding of phenomenon, and not model opacity, in what follows I 
will consider two additional DNN models that have the same level of model opacity and 
black boxing, but differ in their level of link uncertainty. One model has a lower level of 
link uncertainty compared to the deep patient model, the other has a higher level of link 
uncertainty compared the deep patient model.  
Consider a DNN model that identifies cases of melanoma (Esteva et al. [2017]). 
The model works similarly to the deep patient model except that instead of medical records, 
images of melanoma and healthy moles serve as inputs to the system. The model is trained 
with semi-supervision, where the training set includes accurate labels of the images, and is 
then applied to a novel set of images to classify. The results of the model are significant, 
with the researchers claiming it outperforms dermatologists at classification.  
The important point for our purposes is that the melanoma DNN model has the 
same level of implementation black boxing as the deep patient model. And like the deep 
patient model, there are several explanatory questions that might be interesting to ask of 
the model, each with varying levels of answerability. Some of these questions are how-
possibly questions and some of these questions are more pointed why- and how-actually 
questions. However, compared to the deep patient model, the link uncertainty is greatly 
reduced. The level of scientific justification and background knowledge linking the 
appearance of moles to instances of melanoma is extensive. Visual appearance serves as 
the leading deciding factor for initial medical intervention, and for explaining why these 
interventions were made, such as explaining why a mole is more likely to be cancerous, or 
why a particular mole should be biopsied. The DNN model uses the visual appearance of 
the mole and immediate surrounding skin to identify problematic skin lesions. In the 
process, correlations between appearances of moles and the likelihood of the mole being 
healthy is found. The model can help physicians gain understanding about why certain 
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medical interventions are relevant, and using the model can help explain medical 
interventions to patients. Moreover, the model can discover new visual patterns that are 
highly correlated with health or disease. This can further understanding, especially once 
these newly discovered patterns undergo further investigation. 
Implementation black boxes do not get in the way of understanding phenomena in 
the melanoma case because the model is operating within a background of existing 
scientific understanding. So, although we do not understand all the low level details about 
how the model works, and even though the model is complex in its data-points, we gain 
understanding of skin classification nonetheless. There are limits to the model. The model 
was trained primarily on white skin, for example, and thus is unreliable on other skin tones. 
This raises important medical ethical questions; however, the limited scope does not take 
away from the understanding that we gain using the model. Understanding is narrowed to 
a population subset, which is common in medical sciences. Just like many other scientific 
models, the usefulness of the model depends on the target system and the explanandum. If 
certain parameters change, the given model ceases to be the right model for explaining.  
Lastly, consider the other extreme: a DNN model that has even greater link 
uncertainty compared to the deep patient case. Researchers developed a facial recognition 
model that seeks to identify the sexual orientation of individuals (Wang and Kosinski 
[2018]). This model uses roughly the same method as the melanoma model. The input data 
consisted of images of heterosexual men and women along with images of openly self-
identifying gay men and lesbians. The images were of exclusively white American men 
and women taken from dating websites where users documented their orientation. The 
model is able to give striking accuracy in identifying sexual orientation when the model 
had five images of the same person. In the scenario where the model was presented with 
two faces, one of which was an image of someone who self-identified as gay and the other 
an image of someone who self-identified as straight, the model had a 91% labelling 
accuracy rate for men and 83% for women.12  
The same level of implementation black boxing is present in this DNN model as 
with the deep patient and the melanoma model. What differs is the level of link uncertainty. 
The researchers built the model for two scientific purposes. First, to see whether it was 
                                               
12 The accuracy metric used here is AUC accuracy or the receiver operating characteristic curve. 
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possible to identify an individual’s sexual orientation based on facial features alone. 
Second, to add evidential support for the parental hormone theory (PHT), an origin theory 
for sexual orientation. According to the theory, same-gender sexual orientation stems from 
the underexposure of male foetuses and over-exposure of female foetuses to prenatal 
androgens. Such a theory predicts gay and lesbian individuals would display gender 
atypical features (LeVay [2010]).  
Just like with the deep patient case and the melanoma case, there are how-possibly 
explanations that the model can answer.13 One such question is how it is possible to 
determine, just by facial features alone, someone’s openly self-identified sexual 
orientation. However, the researchers take this how-possibly evidence and argue further 
that the model serves as supporting evidence for existing scientific theories, such as the 
PHT theory, and theories connecting facial morphology to psychological traits and 
processes.  Wang and Kosinski say that:  
 
[I]dentifying links between facial features and psychological traits by employing 
methodology similar to the one used here could boost our understanding of the 
origins and nature of a broad range of psychological traits, preferences, and 
psychological processes ([2018], pp. 254). 
 
However, we should be very careful here. The way to gain understanding of the actual 
relationship between facial features and psychological traits, and the origins of sexual-
orientation, involves answering a how-actually or a pointed why question that this model, 
and models like it, cannot answer without resolving the requisite empirical questions and 
link uncertainties. In this case, the link uncertainty is vast. As the researchers themselves 
note, many of the features that the model tracks are cultural features, such as certain 
grooming patterns, and dating-profile picture conventions. Both these features have no 
relationship to androgens and facial morphology, thus severing the connection between the 
model and the phenomenon concerning the actual causes of sexual orientation. 
                                               
13 Several critiques by academic researchers emerged online following the release of Wang and Kosinski’s 
paper. (e.g. Bergstrom and West [unpublished] and Mattson [unpublished]). The critiques raise several 
scientific drawbacks of the study that suggests that the model even falls short of answering how-possibly 
questions. Such models have also inspired artistic critiques concerning privacy and bias (Blas [2013]). 
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Furthermore, the idealized assumptions underlying the model—that sexual orientation is 
binary and static, that those who are openly gay on social media are representative of the 
whole gay population, and ignoring gender and racial variance—distort important 
difference makers in real-world populations (Miller [2018]). To make matters worse, 
existing scientific and social-scientific evidence either speaks against PHT theory, and 
against a dependency relation between facial features and sexual orientation or other 
personality traits (LeVay [1996], [2010]; Magnet [2011]; Mustanski et al. [2002]), or 
speaks against gender atypical traits being the driving factor (Valentova et al. [2014]).  
Given the problems with linking this model to actual real-world phenomena, the model is 
not able to provide understanding of how innate facial features reflect sexual orientation or 
other personality traits, let alone provide understanding of why differences in sexual 
orientation develop. The model, however, could be used to explain and enable 
understanding, even with its level of model opacity, if the surrounding scientific evidence 
did actually suggest that there was a link between facial features and origins of sexual 
orientation. 
I want to stress here that the lack of understanding is not due to implementation or 
model illegibility. The level of implementation black boxing is the same in the deep patient 
case, the melanoma case, and sexual orientation case. If what I have been arguing here is 
right—that there is clear difference between the satisfying level of explanations and 
understanding we can get from each of these three models—then there is something other 
than implementation black boxing that governs the level of understanding the models 
provide. I have argued that the difference in each of these models is the level of link 
uncertainty (the amount, kind, and quality of scientific and empirical evidence supporting 
the link connecting the model to the target-phenomenon) that is present.  
 
 
6 Conclusion 
Are scientists trading understanding for some other epistemic or pragmatic good when they 
choose an opaque DNN? Not quite. DNN models are able to provide how-possibly 
explanations of various phenomena that, just like many minimal models, are the first steps 
to determining which causal mechanisms or dependency relations should be explored 
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further. Moreover, I have argued that so long as we do not have complete black boxing at 
the highest level, understanding is possible from opaque models, so long as there is an 
adequate link connecting the model to the phenomenon of interest. Since DNNs are not 
black boxed at the highest level, the central question that remains—whether a particular 
DNN can explain or enable understanding of the phenomenon it bears on—comes down to 
a question of link uncertainty. 
 This general claim about the importance of removing link uncertainty in order to 
gain understanding stretches beyond the cases of minimal and complex models. For 
example, Strevens ([2017]) argues that black box explanations in convergent evolution fail 
to provide adequate explanations or understanding. When making his argument, he 
specifically appeals to not knowing whether certain aspects unique to each species’ 
evolutionary history made a difference to the evolved behaviour (and he suspects that it 
does). What I have been arguing here suggests that the problem is not with the black box 
surrounding the implementation of how a particular species evolved, but that the empirical 
link between the convergent evolution model and individual populations is in some sense 
uncertain. If the link uncertainty is resolved, our explanations of phenomena and the 
understanding we gain from these explanations can tolerate implementation black boxing.  
 Much more can be said on what precisely it takes for there to be an adequate link 
connecting a model to the phenomenon of interest. The cases discussed in this paper 
indicate that that the stronger the connection we have between the model and the 
phenomenon, the greater the understanding. Moreover, the cases discussed here require an 
empirical connection that involves going outside of the model in question. On the other 
hand, model-based explanations that aim to explain mathematical or structural 
dependences may require something other than empirical evidence to connect the model to 
the phenomenon of interest. I leave this question for future work. 
 Before ending, I want to call attention to three possible worries. First, what if there 
are no explanatory questions that a given DNN model can answer? Indeed, many DNN 
models address simple classification tasks, like identifying a number from a handwritten 
note. One could reasonably  argue that there are no explanatory questions one could ask of 
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such a model; only mere prediction is possible.14 Maybe so. What I have been arguing for 
in this paper is that the complexity and black box nature of DNN models does not prevent 
understanding of phenomena. There may be other reasons that many DNN models cannot 
provide understanding of phenomena. For instance, it might be that there are no 
explanatory questions the model can answer or that some models are mere predictive tools, 
but these are different considerations than the opacity and complexity issue one taken up 
here.   
 Second, one might worry whether the scientific evidence that connects the model 
to the phenomenon of interest is what constitutes our understanding such that the model 
itself no longer plays any epistemic role in our understanding. I have taken some steps to 
address this worry by highlighting the way in which the model is still necessary to explain 
even once we resolve link uncertainty. However, there is a deeper question about whether 
models, in general, are temporary tools to be discarded once we gain more empirical insight 
about the phenomenon. But even if models are mere temporary tools, the point made 
here—that getting better insight into how the model works is not necessary to gain better 
understanding of the phenomena it bears on—still stands.  
Lastly, all the cases I have discussed here, including Schelling’s model, have a level 
of inductive risk.15 Diagnosing medical conditions involves high stakes. Schelling’s model 
and facial recognition models can perpetuate harmful stereotypes and lead to greater 
marginalization of oppressed groups. Thus, there is a deeper question about how these risks 
and social values in general impact the level of explanatory understanding we can gain 
from these models.16 While I focus in this paper simply on black boxes, the way that 
inductive and ethical risk impacts explanatory understanding deserves greater attention.  
 
 
 
                                               
14 That said, even in the simple handwritten number classifier, computational neuroscientists seek answers to 
contrastive explanatory questions between the way machines learn versus humans (Lake et al. [2015]). This 
type of question however is different from the types of questions discussed in this paper.  
15  For discussions on inductive risk and values in science see Douglas ([2000]), Elliott ([2013]), and 
Winsberg ([2012]). 
16 See Potochnik ([2015]) for a discussion of how social values in science may impact when we have 
explanatory understanding.  
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